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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Optimal portfolio allocation models represent important tools in helping investors to de-
cide upon how to split their wealth among assets. The goal of such models is to find what
is called the optimal allocation, i.e. the one that maximizes expected portfolio returns at
a given risk level. The most well known and broadly used portfolio optimization setting
is the mean-variance model introduced in Markowitz (1952). The employed risk measure
is the variance of portfolio returns. Recent research suggests other ways of quantifying
market risk, such as the so called Value-at-Risk (VaR), defined as the highest expected
loss from financial investments over a specified time horizon and subject to a certain
confidence level.
Acting on the VaR-concept, Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) develop a model
for maximizing expected returns subject to both a budget and a desired-VaR constraint.
The latter requires the maximum expected loss to meet an exogenously specified VaR-limit
(the so called desired VaR, henceforth VaR*). One important result of this model is that
the so-called “two-fund separation theorem” applies, as in the classical mean-variance
framework. In other words, neither the investors’ initial wealth nor the desired VaR*
affect the maximization procedure under the VaR constraint. Thus, investors interested
in allocating wealth among risky assets can first determine the risky portfolio composition,
and then decide upon an extra amount of money to be borrowed or lent (i.e. invested
in risk-free assets). The latter takes place according to the individual degree of risk
aversion measured by the selected VaR*. In practice, the former decision is often made by
professional portfolio managers in charge of the construction of an optimal risky portfolio
for their clients. These clients, usually non-professional investors, concentrate on the
second decision step by choosing the amount of money to be invested in the risky portfolio
as a whole, and implicitly fixing the level of the risk-free investment.1 In this context, the
focus of our paper is on the decisions of non-professional investors.2
1In other words, non-professional investors consider the risky portfolio as exogenously given (fixed by
the manager). They are exclusively concerned with determining the final position in risky vs. riskless
assets (i.e. how much money to put in the risky portfolio as a whole, while the rest is allocated to risk-free
assets), according to their own level of risk aversion. We assume that, at the beginning of trading, non-
professional investors already hold well diversified portfolios such as a market index (i.e. the empirical
part of our paper considers the SP500 index as proxy for the risky portfolio). Thus, the problem they
actually face reduces to the allocation of wealth between this risky portfolio (as a whole) and the risk-free
investment alternative.
2The same idea is in keeping with the claim in Markowitz (1952) that the portfolio selection process
develops in two steps. The first one consists of forming beliefs with respect to the future performance
of the potential portfolio components. In the second step, these beliefs underlie the choice of portfolio.
As most academic research has addressed the latter step, we attempt to complete the picture offered in
Markowitz (1952) and try to answer how (non-professional) investors form beliefs about their acceptable
level of risk.
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This separation of the risky and risk-free investments complies with the concept of
“mental accounting”, as first introduced in Thaler (1980). According to Thaler (1992),
people manifest the tendency to frame (i.e. code and evaluate) outcomes in several non-
fungible mental categories or accounts (such as accounts for current income, current wealth
or future income) with different consumption propensities. This mental categorization is
decisive for the perceived utility of those outcomes.
Our paper comes in line with further findings regarding the influence of behavioral
aspects on financial decisions. The prospect theory (abbr. PT) developed in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) stresses that investors perceive
gains and losses differently with respect to a subjective reference and warily avoid losses
(which is denoted as “loss aversion”). Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) apply the
main concepts of the PT to asset pricing, showing that investors derive utility not only
from consumption but also from variations in the perceived value of financial investments.
Moreover, they enrich the PT-formulation claiming that perception of losses appears to
be affected by previous portfolio performance, i.e. by gains and losses accumulated from
past trades and referred to as “cushions”. The idea that past gains and losses may
change the current risk aversion, hence financial decisions, is supported by an empirically
observed phenomenon denoted as the “house money effect” and documented in Thaler and
Johnson (1990). Accordingly, subjects who made money in past gambles appear to behave
less risk aversely in subsequent bets. In other words, past gains make future losses less
painful, while prior losses may increase the risk aversion. A neurobiological explanation of
this human reaction is provided by the “somatic marker hypothesis” in Damasio (1994).
Accordingly, preexisting somatic (i.e. bodily) states can influence new ones by inducing
modifications in the level of activation (threshold) of the new state. As suggested in
Bechara and Damasio (2005), prior somatic states (in our case generated by past series of
gains or losses) can reinforce (impede) the perception of new ones (here, currently expected
gains and losses) by congruous (incongruous) valence (i.e. positivity/negativity). Also,
even when prior performance induces only weak somatic states (known as background
states), it appears to exert an impact on risk aversion. For instance, negative background
states diminish the risk aversion in face of sure losses (because the fear of experience one
more loss after a series of past losses is higher and makes investors more risk loving in the
hope of recovering those losses), while positive background states enhance risk aversion
in face of sure gains (i.e. once several gains are experienced, investor predisposition to
gambling diminishes).
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) develop a plausible explanation for the equity premium
puzzle that relies on the interaction between loss aversion and frequent portfolio evalu-
ations, denoted as “myopic loss aversion” (abbr. mLA). Their findings support the idea
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that, when investors review the performance of their portfolios yearly, the resulting empir-
ical equity premium is consistent with the loss aversion values estimated in the standard
PT framework. The occurrence of mLA has received support from numerous direct ex-
perimental tests, such as Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997a), Gneezy and
Potters (1997), Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), or Haigh and List (2005). According
to Barberis and Huang (2004a), myopia refers strictly to annual evaluations of gains and
losses, hence the term of narrow framing is better suited to describing the underlying phe-
nomenon. In a financial context, narrow framing illustrates the isolate evaluation of stock
market risk (i.e. unrelated to overall wealth risk). As underlined in Barberis and Huang
(2004b), this isolated evaluation entails an underestimation of the stock desirability, even
though, viewed in a wide utility-risk frame, they represent a good diversification modality.
Also, narrow framing can be interpreted as a consequence of regret at not having taken
another decision (non-consumption utility explanation).3 Another explanation relies on
the (higher) accessibility of (financial) information that justifies its over-important role
in final decisions. As referred to in Kahneman (2003), the easily accessible information
is very appealing for the intuitive (i.e. spontaneous, effortless) way in which people use
to make decisions. Our work draws upon the latter motivation, namely accessibility. We
consider it as better suited to financial decisions because nowadays investors are exposed
to a tremendously high quantity of financial information and need to make decisions in a
fast changing financial environment. Consequently, they tend to perform more frequent
checks on their investments.
1.2 Overview
Our model builds on the portfolio optimization setting with exogenous desired VaR* pre-
sented in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001). We extend it by explicitly accounting
for the formation of the individual VaR*-levels. These levels rely on the subjective per-
ception of (non-professional) investors of the risky portfolio performance and of utility
in general, that we formulate in line with PT. In other words, we analyze how non-
professional investors set their subjective VaR* and how this (now endogenous) VaR*
impacts on the wealth allocation between risk-free assets and the risky portfolio.4
3Clearly, this can be also related to the theory of cognitive dissonance introduced in Festinger (1957).
Cognitive dissonance arises from the incompatibility of two cognitions that creates inner tension. It can
exert a strong influence on decision making, being the source of several basic decision heuristics, such as
representativeness, availability, and hindsight bias, as noted in Plous (1993). Specifically, the regret at
not having chosen another alternative creates post-decisional dissonance.
4We consider the mean-VaR optimization framework better suited to combination with the prospect
theory than the classic mean-variance approach. The reason is that the variance represents a symmetric
measure of risk and hence equally accounts for (high) gains and losses, while VaR refers only to the left
tail of the return distribution that corresponds to losses, as underlined in Krokhmal, Palmquist, and
Uryasev (2001). Thus, the distinct subjective perception of gains and losses captured by the prospect
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The first and most important decision of non-professional investors that we analyze
refers to the formulation of VaR*. The value of VaR* determines the optimal portfo-
lio composition and the sum of money to be invested in risk-free assets. As mentioned
above, finding the optimal risky portfolio usually represents the task of professional port-
folio managers and was extensively studied in previous research on portfolio optimization.
However, the resulting values of the total risky vs. the risk-free investment as percent-
ages of total wealth, directly concern non-professional investors. Thus, they become an
object of study in the present work. In our setting, the desired Value-a-Risk (VaR*) is
endogenously defined as the maximum expected loss perceived by individual investors and
depends on past performance, loss aversion, current value of the risky investment and the
expected return premium. We first compute the VaR* and then derive the desired level
of investment in the risky portfolio relative to the risk-free allocation. This allows us to
draw a conclusion about the investor risk aversion and to provide a comparison with the
exogenous-VaR* setting in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001).
The endogenous VaR* relies on the subjective perception of the value generated by one
unit of risky project. In Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) PT, this value is captured
by the so-called value function. Yet, following Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), we
reconsider the original PT-definition of the value function in order to account for the the
idea that individual risk perception is affected by the previous evolution of financial wealth.
Specifically, past performances of the risky investment result in monetary cushions and the
value function is assumed to be linear in both the gain and the loss domain, but steeper in
the latter. Thus, facing past gains (losses) induces a more (less) aggressive behavior, hence
an increase (decrease) in risky portfolio holdings. We present evidence for how different
investment decisions of individual investors can be interpreted as a consequence of different
financial performance histories, how these decisions change subject to the individual degree
of loss aversion, and how our results conform with previously documented findings.
In our model, investors find the optimal solution to their decision problem by maxi-
mizing subjectively perceived utility. This utility is assumed to be derived merely from
changes in financial wealth.5 In line with the PT, the perceived value of risky investments
is denoted as the prospective value. We design two ways of assessing the prospective
value (which reduces in our setting to the expected value of the risky investment). One
definition relies on PT, and another one answers what we call a “worst case scenario”,
where investors are assumed to be concerned with the maximum sustainable (and not
theory may be even more important when VaR is used as measure of risk.
5In other words, investors are interested only in the (perceived) value of their financial investments
(and not in other determinants of utility, such as consumption). This could be due to the fact that
investors narrowly frame, i.e. put excessive emphasis on the importance of financial investments and the
utility they generate. According to Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003), this is a common situation in
practice.
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with the expected) loss in the risky investment. Moreover, we study how investor deci-
sions change according to different market conditions, as captured by the PT-part of the
utility function, and how different ways of representing loss aversion can influence util-
ity. For instance, we expect that risk-averse investors reduce their risky holdings, shifting
their positions to more secure investment alternatives. In addition, we consider two fur-
ther measures that are in our view better suited to measuring the real investor attitude
towards financial losses than the simple coefficient of loss aversion. Namely, we calculate
the loss aversion index according to Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) and introduce its
counterpart in terms of the prospective value denoting it as global first-order risk aver-
sion. In addition to the loss aversion coefficient, the first measure captures the influence of
past losses and gains, while the second encompasses the expectations about future market
conditions, which are aspects of practical importance for the non-professional financial
decisions.
Acting on the mLA in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), we further study how investment
decisions change under different portfolio evaluation horizons (such as one day, one month,
two months up to one year, then two up to eight years). In other words, we investigate
how the evaluation frequency exerts influence on the risk perception and wealth allocation.
In this context, we estimate the evolution of the prospective value as well as of our two
further measures of the investor attitude towards financial losses (i.e. the loss aversion
index and the global first-order risk aversion), as functions of the evaluation frequency.
Moreover, we address the problem of optimal evaluation horizons. Finally, we derive
equivalent significance levels for VaR* at each trading time and compare them to the
corresponding significance levels used in the original model of Campbell, Huisman, and
Koedijk (2001).
The theoretical findings from the first part of our paper are implemented and amended
in the subsequent empirical part. We rely on real market data between 1982-2006, such
as the SP500 index as proxy for the risky portfolio and the US 10-year bond accounting
for the risk-free investment alternative. Also, we analyze various specifications for the
distribution of expected returns, cushions, and model parameters (such as the coefficient
of loss aversion and the sensitivity to past losses). Our empirical findings lead to several
interesting conclusions. First, the risky holdings of non-professional investors substan-
tially vary subject to the portfolio evaluation frequency and to the horizon over which
cushions accumulate. Thus, investors performing annual portfolio evaluations invest on
average between 26− 50% of their wealth in risky assets, depending on the type of cush-
ion (myopic or cumulative) and on the expected return distribution. These percentages
decrease to values under 2% for the evaluation horizon of one day. Second, the cushions
generated by past portfolio performance appear to drive the current perception of the
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risky prospect. Thus, when investors are unable to accumulate positive significant cush-
ions, most of their wealth is directed to the risk-free investment. In other words, even
when the coefficient of loss aversion remains constant over trading dates, financial wealth
fluctuations determined by the success of previous decisions play a key role in the current
portfolio allocation. Third, the creation of positive and significant cushions is inversely
related to the portfolio evaluation frequency. As this frequency increases, the ability to
accumulate profits decreases and a lower wealth portion will be invested in risky assets.
Fourth, our results support the idea that one year appears to be the most plausible evalu-
ation frequency used by non-professional loss-averse investors in practice, as suggested in
Benartzi and Thaler (1995). Further estimations show that the evolution of the perceived
portfolio utility (i.e. of the prospective value) for different evaluation frequencies can be
decomposed into two distinct intervals, namely one for high evaluation frequencies (below
one year), and a second one for low frequencies (above one year). The prospective value on
the first interval can be analytically represented as a third-order polynomial. It increases
subject to higher evaluation horizons, specifically at enhanced speed for horizons at the ex-
treme quarters of the left one year interval. On the second segment, the prospective value
appears to be upward-sloping and of the fourth degree. A similar segmentation can be
observed for both measures of the actual investor attitude towards financial losses, namely
the loss aversion index and the global first-order risk aversion. Their evolutions can be
described equally well by third-degree polynomials for evaluation frequencies higher than
one year, while for lower frequencies the global first-order risk aversion is approximatively
linear. We argue that these two further measures of the loss attitude provide additional
information on the investor sensitivity to financial losses subject to different performance
histories, which can be of help in isolating practically relevant parameter values. Fifth, the
VaR*-levels assessed within our setting on the basis of real market data point out that, in
practice, the risk aversion of real non-professional investors may be higher than the values
obtained for confidence levels commonly considered in previous theoretical papers, such as
90%, 95% and 99%. Finally, the average equivalent coefficients of loss aversion computed
for fixed confidence levels of 99% and 90% lie far below the widely documented and em-
pirically supported value of 2.25. Again, this implies that previous research considering
these confidence levels underestimates the aversion to losses manifest in practice. The
average coefficient of loss aversion lies around one, which implies that under exogenous
VaR* constraints investors treat gains and losses in the same way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main the-
oretical considerations. We start with a brief review of the optimal portfolio selection
model with exogenous VaR* as in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), on which we
build our own theoretical structure. Section 2.2 takes on the reformulation of the value
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functions in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), out of which we derive the the loss aver-
sion index. In Section 2.3 we introduce the notions of VaR* and propose different ways
of quantifying the endogenous VaR*. The subsequent Section 2.4 frames distinct ways of
assessing the value of the risky portfolio as perceived by individual investors and adopts
the notion of global first-order risk aversion. Section 2.5 treats the influence of variable
portfolio evaluation frequencies on the prospective value and on our additional measures
of the investor attitude towards financial losses. Section 3 illustrates the empirical imple-
mentation of our theoretical model. In particular, Section 3.1 discusses the impact of the
evaluation frequency and of the cushion on the evolution of wealth percentages invested
in the risky portfolio. In Section 3.2, we analyze the evolution of the prospective utility
in time and in the evaluation frequency domain, an investigation that is replicated in Sec-
tion 3.3 for the index of loss aversion and the global first-order risk aversion, subject to
different revision frequencies. Finally, Section 3.4 restates our model in terms of previous
research with exogenous VaR*, where equivalent significance levels of portfolio risk and of
the loss aversion coefficient, that result from the average VaR* computed from our data
and according to our model equations, are inferred. Section 4 summarizes the results and
concludes. Graphics and further results are included in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical model
This section contains the main theoretical considerations of our work. We start by pre-
senting the model of portfolio selection with VaR as the risk measure and an exogenous
desired risk aversion (VaR*) of Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001). This model has
motivated us to extend the analysis for the case with endogenous VaR*. Subsequently,
we formulate our own setting by referring to the individual perception of risky projects
and detailing the construction of the endogenous measure of risk aversion VaR* and its
implications for individual investor decisions. More precisely, we show how the investor-
desired VaR* can be formulated and how it flows into the prospective value of the risky
investment that investors aim at maximizing. We also enrich the definition of the real
investor attitude towards losses by first calculating the loss aversion index and next the so-
called global first-order risk aversion. Moreover, we analyze how the prospective value and
these two additional risk attitude measures vary subject to different portfolio evaluation
frequencies.
2.1 Optimal portfolio selection with exogenous VaR*
Let us first refresh the portfolio selection model with exogenous VaR* introduced in
Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001). Accordingly, financial assets are allocated by
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maximizing the expected return subject to the common budget constraint, as well as
to an additional risk constraint, where risk is measured by the so-called Value-at-Risk
(VaR). The optimal portfolio is derived such that the maximum expected loss does not
exceed the VaR*-level indicated by non-professional investors. This VaR* represents the
maximum acceptable loss for a chosen investment horizon and at a given confidence level.
Additionally, investors can borrow or lend money at the fixed market interest rate.
We denote by Wt the investor wealth at time t, by Bt the amount of money to borrow
(Bt > 0) or to lend (Bt < 0) at the fixed risk-free gross return rate Rf , and by VaR* the
individually desired VaR (specified later in this section). Let the risky portfolio consist
of i = 1, . . . n financial assets with single time t prices pi,t and define the set of portfolio
weights at time t as [wt ∈ R
n :
∑n
i=1wi,t = 1]. Moreover, xi,t = wi,t(Wt+Bt)/pi,t represents
the number of shares of the asset i contained in the portfolio at time t. Obviously, the
portfolio gross return at next trade (Rt+1) depends on the portfolio composition at the
current date wt. With the budget constraint:
Wt +Bt =
n∑
i=1
xi,tpi,t = x
′
tpt, (2.1)
the value of the portfolio at t+ 1 results in:
Wt+1(wt) = (Wt +Bt)Rt+1(wt)−BtRf . (2.2)
As the investor desired-VaR (VaR*) is defined as the maximum expected loss over a
given investment horizon and for a given confidence level 1-α6, we can write:
Pt[Wt+1(wt) ≤ Wt − VaR
∗] ≤ 1− α, (2.3)
where Pt is the conditional probability on the available information at time t. Equation
(2.3) represents the risk constraint that (professional) investors have to take into account
in addition to the budget constraint (2.1) when searching for optimal portfolio weights.
The portfolio optimization problem can be now expressed in terms of the maximization
of expected portfolio returns Et[Wt+1(wt)], subject to both the budget restriction and the
VaR*-constraint:
w∗t ≡ argmax
wt
{(Wt +Bt)Et[Rt+1(wt)]−BtRf}, s.t. (2.1) and (2.3). (2.4)
Here, Et[Rt+1(wt)] represents the expected return of the portfolio given the information
at time t.
6Note that VaR* is considered as the loss in absolute value, being hence positive.
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The optimization problem can be rewritten in an unconstrained way, by replacing (2.1)
in (2.2) and taking expectations:
Et[Wt+1(wt)] = x
′
tpt(Et[Rt+1(wt)]−Rf ) +WtRf . (2.5)
Equation (2.5) points out that risk-averse investors are going to put a fraction of their
wealth in risky assets if the expected risky portfolio return is higher than the risk-free
rate Et[Rt+1(wt)] ≥ Rf .
Substituting (2.5) (before taking expectation) in (2.3) gives:
P [x′tpt(Rt+1(wt)−Rf ) +WtRf ≤ Wt − VaR
∗] ≤ 1− α,
so that
P
[
Rt+1(wt) ≤ Rf −
VaR∗ +Wt(Rf − 1)
x′tpt
]
≤ 1− α (2.6)
defines the quantile qt(wt, α) of the distribution of portfolio returns for a given confidence
level 1− α (or probability of occurrence α).
Thus, the budget constraint can be restated as:
x′tpt =
VaR∗ +Wt(Rf − 1)
Rf − qt(wt, α)
. (2.7)
Finally, substituting (2.7) in (2.5) and dividing by the initial wealth Wt, we obtain a
new expression to be maximized:
Et[Wt+1(wt)]
Wt
=
VaR∗ +Wt(Rf − 1)
WtRf −Wtqt(wt, α)
(Et[Rt+1(wt)]−Rf ) +Rf . (2.8)
Given that at moment t of maximization, Wt is known and Rf is fixed, the optimal
portfolio composition can be derived as:
w∗t ≡ argmax
wt
Et[Rt+1(wt)]−Rf
WtRf −Wtqt(wt, α)
. (2.9)
Equation (2.9) shows that, similarly to the traditional mean-variance framework, the
two-fund separation theorem applies, i.e. neither the (non-professional) investor’s initial
wealth nor the desired VaR* affect the maximization procedure. In other words, investors
can first allocate wealth inside the risky portfolio (i.e. among different risky assets) and
second fix the extra amount money to be borrowed or lent (i.e. invested in risk-free assets).
The latter reflects by how much the portfolio VaR varies according to the investor degree
of risk aversion, which is measured by the selected (desired) VaR* level. Replacing (2.1)
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in (2.7), we further derive:7
Bt =
VaR∗ +VaRt
Rf − qt(w∗t , α)
(2.10a)
VaRt = Wt[qt(w
∗
t , α)− 1]. (2.10b)
Thus, the desired VaR* is imposed by the client prior to the portfolio formation
and enters the portfolio optimization problem in form of a constraint. By contrast, the
portfolio VaR is an output of this optimization and measures the actual maximum loss
that can be incurred at time t at the confidence level 1 − α for the obtained optimal
portfolio w∗.
2.2 The value function
Coming from the main ideas of the Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) setting, our
model goes a step further by asking how individual investors set their desired level of
risk aversion VaR*. We elaborate on the construction of an endogenous VaR* and its
implications for the wealth allocation between risky and the risk-free assets.
Investor desires depend on their perception of the value of financial investments. PT
suggests how individual perceptions of financial performance can be formalized by means
of the so-called value function. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), human minds take for actual carriers of value not the absolute
outcomes of a project, but their changes defined as departures from an individual reference
point. The deviations above (below) this reference are labelled as gains (losses). Thus,
the value function is kinked at the reference point and exhibits distinct evolution in the
domains of gains and losses, i.e. it is steeper for losses (a property known as loss aversion).
Also, it shows diminishing sensitivity in both domains (namely, it is concave for gains but
convex for losses).
As noted in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), the view of the original PT over
individual perceptions of risky investments can be enriched by accounting for the potential
impact of past performance (i.e. in addition to the mental distinction between gains and
losses). Accordingly, the value function additionally reflects the influence of a so-called
cushion, defined as the difference between the current value of the risky investment St and
a benchmark level from the past Zt (e.g. the purchasing price of the stock). When this
difference is positive, investors made money from past risky investment, otherwise they
accumulated losses.
7The expression qt(w
∗
t , α)− 1 in Equation (2.10b) should be viewed as the quantile of the net returns
Rt−1 and corresponds to the quantile qt(w
∗
t , α) of the gross returns Rt. Equation (2.10a) can be restated
in terms of net returns as: Bt = (VaR
∗ +VaR)/[(Rf − 1)− (qt(w
∗
t , α)− 1)].
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Our approach relies on the formulation of the value function proposed in Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2001). In their Equations (15) and (16), the reference point changes
with the past performance (from ztRft for zt ≤ 1 to Rft for zt > 1, where zt = Zt/St). We
restate these definitions, in order to obtain identical reference points and similar courses
in the loss domain for both considered cases with positive and negative cushions, as in
the original PT formulation, where gains are defined as the difference between the value
function argument (here Rt+1) and the reference point. Thus, we fix the reference value
in both cases (with prior gains zt ≤ 1 and prior losses zt > 1) to Rft and rearrange the
terms in Equations (15) and (16) in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), obtaining:
vt+1 =


St(Rt+1 −Rft) , for Rt+1 ≥ Rft
λSt(Rt+1 −Rft) + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft , for Rt+1 < Rft
, for zt ≤ 1(⇔ Zt ≤ St),
(2.11)
and
vt+1 =


St(Rt+1 −Rft) , for Rt+1 ≥ Rft
λSt(Rt+1 −Rft) + k(Zt − St)(Rt+1 −Rft) , for Rt+1 < Rft
, for zt > 1(⇔ Zt > St).
(2.12)
Here, λ is denoted as the coefficient of loss aversion and the parameter k > 0 captures
the influence of previous losses on the perception of current ones (i.e. the larger the
previous loss is, the more painful the next losses become). We observe that, while the gain
branches of both value functions are invariable to past performance zt, the loss branches
contain a first term that resembles the original PT, i.e. λSt(Rt+1−Rft), but also a second
one revealing the impact of the cushion St − Zt. Moreover, the time t + 1-value of the
risky investment is derived as:
St+1 = (Wt +Bt)Rt+1. (2.13)
Of note is also the fact that the joint impact of the loss aversion coefficient λ and of
past losses k changes the actual investor aversion to losses. This can be easily deduced
by merging Equations (2.11) and (2.12) to:
vt+1 =


Stxt+1 , for xt+1 ≥ 0
[λSt − (1− pit)k(St − Zt)]xt+1 + pit(λ− 1)Rft(St − Zt) , for xt+1 < 0,
where pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1) is the probability of experiencing past gains and xt+1 = Rt+1−Rft
the equity return premium. Obviously, the loss branch of the above Equation (2.2) is more
complex than the simple multiple of the gain branch with the loss aversion coefficient,
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as suggested by the PT. In order to capture this complexity, we follow the definition in
Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) (p. 121) and derive the index of loss aversion (abbr. LAi)
as the ratio of the left and right derivatives of the value function at the reference point.
In our case:
∂vt+1
∂xt+1
=


St , for xt+1 ≥ 0
λSt − (1− pit)k(St − Zt) , for xt+1 < 0,
hence we can express the LAi as:
λ˜t =
λSt − (1− pit)k(St − Zt)
St
= λ− (1− pit)k(1− zt). (2.14)
Clearly, LAi contains more information than the simple loss aversion coefficient λ
introduced in the PT: The series of past gains (losses), i.e. zt ≤ 1 (zt > 1), lower
(increase) the actual investor aversion to losses, because they are more (less) confident in
being able to cover prospective losses by past gains. Also, an increased sensitivity to past
losses, i.e. a higher k, in the case with negative past performance zt > 1 yields higher
LAi-values. LAi is to be interpreted analogously to the simple coefficient of loss aversion,
so that higher values point to an enhanced aversion towards financial losses. Henceforth,
in line with the original PT formulation, we mostly refer with “loss aversion” to the loss
aversion coefficient λ and with “actual investor attitude towards financial losses” to the
LAi (and the gRA from Section 2.4).
2.3 The endogenous VaR*
Our first goal is to formulate the maximum loss a-priori expected by individual investors,
i.e. the individual desired VaR*. This value will subsequently enter the optimization
problem and serve non-professional investors to decide between borrowing or lending.
To this end, we start from the literal definition of VaR* as viewed by non-experts, con-
centrating on the notions of “maximum”, “loss”, and “individual”. First, VaR* quantifies
losses. However, according to the PT, what actually counts for individual investors is not
the absolute magnitude of a loss, but rather the subjectively perceived one, as captured
by the value function. Hence, VaR* should rely on the subjective value (or utility) of
losses expressed in the loss branches of the value functions (2.11) and (2.12). It depends
on individual investor characteristics (originating in the subjective view over gains and
losses) and can vary over time. Second, VaR* should represent a (subjective) expecta-
tion because the next period returns Rt+1, on which the evaluation of risky investments
relies, are still unknown at the decision time t. Third, we are looking for a maximal value
such that in calculating VaR* investors must ascribe a maximal occurrence probability
Pt(Et[Rt+1] < Rft) = 1 to the losses in the value function.
14
Therefore, we propose that VaR* accounts for the maximum expectation of sustainable
losses as resulting from individual valuations of the risky investment. However, we consider
investors to be sophisticated enough in order to consider that not only the mean, but also
the variation of prospective losses should be considered in order to accurately ascertain
the maximum acceptable loss level. Thus, in a second approximation, we extend the
VaR*-definition by adjusting for the loss variance.
Henceforth, we consider that value functions are weighted by the pure probabilities of
occurrence (and not by non-linear probability functions as stated in the cumulative PT
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). According to Equations (2.11) and (2.12), we then
derive:
Et[loss-utilityt+1] = pit[λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft]
+ (1− pit)[λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + k(Zt − St)(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]
= λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + [pit(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit)k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)](St − Zt)
(2.15a)
V art[loss-utilityt+1] = Et[loss-utility
2
t+1]− E
2
t [loss-utilityt+1]
= pit[λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft]
2
+ (1− pit)[λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + k(Zt − St)(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]
2
− E2t [loss-utilityt+1]
= [λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]
2
+ [pit(λ− 1)
2R2ft − (1− pit)k
2(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)
2](St − Zt)
2
+ 2[pit(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit)k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)(St − Zt)
− [λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]
2
− [pit(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit)k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]
2(St − Zt)
2
− 2[pit(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit)k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)(St − Zt)
= pit(1− pit)[(λ− 1)Rft + k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)]
2(St − Zt)
2. (2.15b)
Note that while the first term of the expected losses (2.15a) is similar to the loss-
formulation in the PT, the remaining terms point out the influence of the cushion accu-
mulated over past trades. In contrast, the variance of losses (2.15b) is exclusively dictated
by the cushion-part, as individually perceived by investors, and depends on the probabil-
ity of having made gains or losses in the past, on the variance of expected returns with
respect to the reference risk-free rate, and on the squared cushion.
As mentioned above, in a first approximation we stick to the literal definition of VaR*
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as an expectation and design VaR* as the maximum expected loss:
VaR∗1t+1 = Et[loss-utilityt+1]
= λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + [pit(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit)k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)](St − Zt).
(2.16)
However, investors may consider loss-variance as an equally important parameter for
determining the maximal sustainable loss. Then, assuming that VaR* follows a cer-
tain distribution (i.e. normal or Student-t)8 with the value ϕ, we introduce the second
(variance-adjusted) VaR* definition:9
VaR∗t+1 = Et[loss-utilityt+1]− ϕ
√
V art[loss-utilityt+1], (2.17)
which, according to Equations (2.15a) and (2.15b), results in:
VaR∗t+1 = λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)
+ [(pit − ϕ
√
pit(1− pit))(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit + ϕ
√
pit(1− pit))k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)](St − Zt).
(2.18)
Again, expression (2.18) encompasses the twofold loss effect stemming from the loss
aversion coefficient of the original PT and from the cushion of the extended PT introduced
in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
It is worth noting that, for sure gains (i.e. when pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1) = 1), both VaR*
expressions (2.16) and (2.18) reach a common upper bound:
VaR∗1,upt+1 = VaR
∗up
t = λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + (λ− 1)Rft(St − Zt), (2.19)
while for sure losses (i.e. when pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1) = 0), the lowest value of:
VaR∗1,lot+1 = VaR
∗lo
t = λSt(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)− k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)(St − Zt) (2.20)
is attained.
The definition of VaR* serves to determine the optimal level of borrowing or lending
(Bt) from Equation (2.10a). When VaR* lies “to the left” of the portfolio VaR (i.e. it is
lower in absolute value than VaR), Bt is negative, hence investors become more risk averse
8Although VaR is a very popular measure of risk, it has been criticized because it does not satisfy
one of the four properties for coherent risk measure, namely subadditivity (see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber,
and Heath (1999), Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) and Szego¨ (2002)). However, according to Embrechts,
McNeil, and Straumann (1999), VaR becomes subadditive and can be considered as a coherent risk
measure, if used in the case of elliptic joint distributions, such as normal and Student-t with finite
variance.
9Equation (2.17) results from the assumption that:
(VaR∗t+1 − Et[loss-utilityt+1])/(
√
V art[loss-utilityt+1]) = ϕ ∼ N(0, 1) or t(5).
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and save money. By contrast, for a VaR* higher than VaR in absolute value, investors
augment their risky investment by borrowing extra money. Thus, an empirical analysis
of the evolution of Bt (as conducted in Section 3) can shed some light on the investor risk
behavior.
Also, one interesting topic to investigate lies in estimating the equivalent loss aver-
sion parameter λ∗¯t that can be obtained for a VaR
∗
t+1 = VaR
∗ fixed for commonly used
significance levels such as 1%, 5% or 10%. The result is immediate from Definition (2.18):
λ∗¯t+1 =
VaR∗ + [(pit − v
√
pit(1− pit))Rft + (1− pit + v
√
pit(1− pit))k(Et[Rt+1]−Rft)](St − Zt)
St(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + (pit − v
√
pit(1− pit))Rft(St − Zt)
.
(2.21)
Moreover, since λ∗¯t+1 depends on the fixed (i.e. exogenous) VaR
∗, there should exist
no further causal relationship between past and future losses, such that we can set k = 0.
Accordingly, Equation (2.21) becomes:
λ∗¯t+1 =
VaR∗ + [(pit − v
√
pit(1− pit))Rft](St − Zt)
St(Et[Rt+1]−Rft) + (pit − v
√
pit(1− pit))Rft(St − Zt)
. (2.22)
2.4 The prospective value of the risky investment
The estimation of the maximum acceptable individual loss level represents only the first
step in our analysis. As shown in Section 2.1, one of its consequences with direct impact
on non-professional investors resides in the determination of the optimal borrowing level.
This results as a byproduct of the optimization inside the risky portfolio undertaken by
the professional manager. For the non-professional client it amounts to the optimal choice
in terms of wealth percentages allocated between risky and riskless assets.
When investors decide on the optimal sum of money to be put in the risky portfolio
(or equivalently in risk-free assets), they might not exclusively think in terms of VaR*,
but sooner aim at maximizing the utility generated by their financial investments. This
utility is encompassed in the PT by the so called prospective value of the risky investment
Vt+1.
10 Denoting the expected equity return premium by Et[xt+1] = Et[Rt+1] − Rft and
the probability of a positive premium by ωt = Pt(Et[Rt+1] ≥ Rft) = Pt(Et[xt+1] ≥ 0), the
prospective value of the risky investment can be formulated as:
Vt+1 = [ωt+(1−ωt)λ]StEt[xt+1]+(1−ωt){pit(λ−1)Rft−(1−pit)kEt[xt+1]}(St−Zt). (2.23)
Furthermore, we resolve to analyze the evolution of the prospective value for different
portfolio evaluation frequencies, on the grounds that revising portfolio performance at
10Remember that our investors are not concerned with consumption and derive utility merely from
financial wealth fluctuations.
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different time intervals implies drawing back on distinct return values, hence on different
return premia. This implicitly changes the values of several model parameters such as St,
Zt, pit, or ωt affecting the prospective value (2.23), a topic detailed in Section 2.5.
Yet, in practice, risk-averse investors may rely on a slightly different method for eval-
uating expected values of risky prospects. For instance, they may continue to consider
gains as unsure events and account for them as “wishes” (i.e. expectations). However,
losses would be assessed at their maximal impact, so to speak in a “worst case scenario”.
If this is the case, gains flow into the definition of the prospective value as expected gains,
exactly as in Equation (2.23), while losses take the form of VaR*. In other words, investors
are sufficiently wary as to take into account the possibility of experiencing a maximal loss,
hence to put an upper bound (in absolute value) on expected losses. It is this upper bound
that now generates utility (value) to the individual investor, and not the expected loss.
These considerations entail an alternative definition V ∗t+1 of the prospective value:
V ∗t+1 = ωtStEt[xt+1] + VaR
∗
t+1
= (ωt + λSt)Et[xt+1]
+ [(pit − ϕ
√
pit(1− pit))(λ− 1)Rft − (1− pit + ϕ
√
pit(1− pit))kEt[xt+1]](St − Zt),
(2.24)
where the latter expression was derived according to Equation (2.18). In Section 3.2.2,
we investigate the evolution and implications of both prospective value definitions stated
here.
Before closing this section, we introduce a further notion that in our opinion provides
additional information on the actual investor attitude towards financial risks compared
to the simple coefficient of loss aversion. According to the original PT, loss aversion
corresponds to risk aversion of first order in the loss domain. In this spirit, we denote the
first derivative of the prospective value with respect to the expected equity premium as
global first-order risk aversion (abbr. gRA) and formally define it as:
Λt =
∂Vt+1
∂Et[xt+1]
= [ωt+(1−ωt)λ]St−(1−ωt)(1−pit)k(St−Zt) = St[ωt+(1−ωt)λ˜t]. (2.25)
Specifically, the gRA reflects the sensitivity (in terms of first-order changes) of the
prospective value (which can be rendered in traditional terms as investment utility) to
the variation of expected returns (that yields to the variation of the expected equity
premium). In our opinion, the gRA represents another way of quantifying the attitude of
non-professional investors to financial losses that captures complementary features with
respect to the LAi. While the LAi measures the differences in perception (of one unit
risky investment) around the reference, the gRA is more general (and for this reason
termed “global”) and captures the slope of the aggregate individual view over both gain
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and losses. Yet formally the two measures are closely connected with each other, in the
sense that the gRA per unit of risky investment yields a linear transformation of the
LAi weighted by the probability of facing current losses. Consequently, the gRA varies
similarly to LAi with respect to cushions and the sensitivity to past losses. Note however
that LAi and gRA are to be differently interpreted. Specifically, as gRA directly reflects
the changes in the prospective value that is proportional to the attractiveness of financial
investments, higher gRA-values denote a more relaxed loss attitude.
2.5 The impact of the portfolio evaluation frequency
As shown in the previous sections, the expected portfolio returns Et[Rt+1] (hence the
expected return premium Et[xt+1]) play a major role in the formulation of the value
function and consequently of almost all other variables of interest in our model (such as
VaR*, the prospective value, the optimal borrowing level, and also future cushions, gain
probabilities, etc.). Therefore, it is essential to notice that the value of returns directly
depends on the time horizon τ over which they are computed, i.e. or on the portfolio
evaluation frequency 1/τ . We hypothesize that different evaluation frequencies impact
on investor risk behavior and lead to different investment decisions. The main reason
for this resides in the dependence of the computed performance of the risky portfolio
on expected returns, which further gives rise to the dependency of the investor attitude
towards the risky deposit and of the money invested in it on the portfolio evaluation
frequency. The higher this frequency is, the less likely it is that risky returns lie above
riskless ones, thus the more pronounced the investor disappointment concerning the risky
portfolio performance. Since according to the PT registered losses are perceived as more
painful than gains of similar size, risky investments become even less attractive.
The idea that the joint effect of narrow framing (myopia) over financial decisions and
of the reluctance to make losses can dramatically impact risk perception and hence the
subjective desirability of risky investments comes in line with the concept of mLA. The
empirical part of our paper (Section 3) analyzes closely the impact of various evaluation
horizons (ranging from one day to eight years) on the risk-free investment and on the
prospective value, where the focus lies on high evaluation frequencies (the ones that are
more plausible in practice), such as one day, one week, one month, two months and more,
up to one year. In Section 3.2.1, we also plot and empirically assess the analytical forms
of the LAi from Equation (2.14) and of the gRA from Equation (2.25) as functions of the
evaluation frequency. Yet, in order to better understand how the evaluation frequency
impacts the prospective value and the investor attitude towards risk, further explanations
are necessary and the rest of this section is dedicated to detailing this problem.
We start by noting that the first variable affected by the evaluation horizon τ is the
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gross return value Rt(τ) = log(Pt/Pt−τ ) that accounts for the price variation over the
time interval τ . Therefore, the expected return premium Et[xt+1(τ)] = Et[Rt+1(τ)]−Rft
depends on the evaluation frequency.11 For instance, if prices are highly volatile in the
short run but do not change very much in mean in the long run, a higher τ should generate
higher returns. However, even though there are more parameters (such as St, Zt, pit, etc.)
that are computed from Rt(τ) being thus affected by τ , in our (empirical) analysis we
assume all λ, k, and Rf as fixed (i.e. independent of τ). Therefore, the changes of the
prospective value Vt+1 documented in Section 3.2.1 are a consequence of a chain impact
whose very first seed is the evaluation horizon, but that does not imply the loss aversion
coefficient λ.12 Obviously, although this chain reaction (hence its source, τ) does not
change the simple coefficient of loss aversion, it also affects our measures of the actual
attitude towards financial losses LAi and gRA:
λ˜(τ) = λ− [1− pi(τ)]k[1− z(τ)]
Λ(τ) = S(τ)[ω(τ) + (1− ω(τ))λ˜(τ)].
As both LAi and gRA are computed as derivatives over the (expected) equity premium,
the variation of x(τ) is excluded. Thus, potential changes of (one of) these measures
subject to the evaluation horizon τ reflect the indirect impact of τ on other model variables
such as pi, z, or ω.
In addition, we address a further theoretical issue which is closely related to the impact
of the portfolio evaluation frequency discussed above. Given that this frequency appears
to affect the investor risk perception, thus the level of risky investments, could the reverse
causality hold as well? In other words, for a certain loss aversion value (at time t) is there
an evaluation frequency that is optimal in terms of maximization of the prospective value?
In order to answer this question, we first analyze the direct impact of Rt(τ) on the utility
maximization problem of individual investors. To this end, the c.p. dependence of the
prospective value V (x) from Equation (2.23)13 on x(τ) at time t is taken into account. In
other words, we study the direct dependence of utility on returns, but discard the indirect
effects generated by other model parameters influenced by returns.14 In Section 3.2.1,
we search for a generally valid specification V (τ) that can be inverted in order to deliver
11For reasons of simplicity, we henceforth drop most of the time-indices at places where we discuss the
dependence of the variables calculated at (the fixed) time t on τ .
12This chain reaction takes place in successive steps: (1) τ → Et[xt+1] =: x(τ), (2) x(τ)→ St =: S(τ),
(3) S1, S2, ...St → St − Zt =: S(τ)− Z(τ).
13Or the corresponding V ∗(x) from Equation (2.24).
14In essence, this can be considered a plausible assumption. The choice of an optimal current τ takes
place at the fixed time t where the model parameters indirectly affected by τ (i.e. S, Z, pi), depend on
past values of x. The only exception is ωt(τ) that depends on τ through Et[xt+1(τ)], but assuming that
investors also assess ω on the basis of past experience (e.g. as the frequency of past positive return premia),
we can confine ourselves to analyze the isolate role of Et[xt+1(τ)] in the prospective value function.
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the optimal τ . Second, in the same empirical part of the paper we analyze the indirect
dependence on the portfolio evaluation frequency by focusing on the two measures of the
actual attitude towards losses LAi and gRA. Observing that they actually change with
τ , we infer analytical specifications of the type λ˜(τ) and Λ(τ) and derive the τ -values at
which they are minimized.
3 Empirical results
This chapter presents empirical findings complying with the theoretical results derived in
Section 2.
The empirical analysis is based on daily data for the SP500 index and the 10-year
nominal returns bond (considered as the risky and the risk-free investment alternative,
respectively), ranging from 01/02/1962 to 03/09/2006 (11,005 observations).15 From this
data set, we construct daily, weekly, monthly (up to eleven months, increasing one month
at the time), yearly and further lower frequency returns (ranging from two to eight years,
with a one-year increment). We divide our sample into two parts on the basis of the fact
that the early 80s mark the beginning of a new era of financial markets, due to the financial
reform in 1979 that significantly changed the trading conditions. Consequently, we reckon
that only the second part of the data (from 03/01/198216 to 03/09/2006, specifically
6,010 observations) is relevant for inferring current market evolutions and consider it as
our “active” data set on which the subsequent empirical investigations are based. The
first part of the sample (from 01/02/1962 to 03/01/1982) serves to estimate the empirical
mean and the standard deviation of the portfolio returns at date zero of the trade (i.e. at
03/01/1982). Yet, the active data set contains an outlier corresponding to the October
1987 market crash which may distort the results. Because the real market data serves
in our work merely as support for simulating trading behaviors, that we view as more
general, this outlier is smoothened out by replacing it with the mean of the ten before
and after data points.17
We consider that non-professional investors perceive risky investments according to
the value functions in Equations (2.11) and (2.12), and calculate the maximum loss level
according to Equation (2.18). The active data set allows us to run the model on the basis
of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 and to derive the desired VaR*, as well as the wealth proportion
invested in the risky portfolio (i.e. in the SP500 index). The remaining money is assumed
to be automatically put in the risk-free 10-year bond. Moreover, investors are assumed
15Descriptive statistics can be found in Tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix.
16It took several years until the financial reform became operative.
17We consider that this method is appropriate for preserving some of the particularities of less probable
market events such as crashes, while at the same time allowing for circumvention of excessive impacts
due to extreme outliers.
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to start trading with an even initial wealth allocation between the risky portfolio and the
bond.18 We also assume that the number of investors is constant, i.e. no investors can
enter or exit the market during the trading interval (corresponding to the second part of
the data).19
3.1 The evolution of the risky investment
In this section we address the interrelated questions of how risky investments develop
subject to different portfolio evaluation frequencies and to distinct ways of assessing the
cushion. Finally, we discuss the impact of applying the simpler definition VaR∗1 (that
merely accounts for maximum expected losses) on the wealth percentages invested in the
risky portfolio.
3.1.1 The impacts of the portfolio evaluation frequency and of the cushion
According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), loss-averse investors who evaluate the perfor-
mance of their portfolios once a year and employ a linear value function with conventional
PT parameter values, give rise to a market evolution that can explain the equity premium
observed in practice. In this context, we are interested in how varying the portfolio evalu-
ation frequency can change investor decisions, hence the market evolution in our setting.
Furthermore, we ask which is the impact of different ways of assessing the cushion
on investor decisions. First, the value Zt of past portfolio performance that impacts the
valuation of current losses is taken to be identical to the last period risky asset holding
Zt = St−1. This applies to what we denote as myopic cushions. Second, as we assume that
investors do not enter or exit the market during the entire trading interval, it is plausible
to consider that they assess the investment performance starting with date zero. In other
words, they amass what we call cumulative cushions by setting Zt =
t∑
i=0
Si, which comes
in line with Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
Following Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), we start by computing the portfo-
lio VaR in Equation (2.10b) for either (standard) normally or Student-t (with five degrees
of freedom) distributed portfolio gross returns and for a significance level of 5%. In addi-
tion, we account for different ways of computing the expected portfolio returns, namely as
the unconditional mean returns until the last date before the decision time, a zero mean
process, or an AR(1) process. Then, taking λ = 2.25 and k = 3 as in Barberis, Huang,
18A similar assumption is made in Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997b).
19This assumption implies that the evaluation period is shorter than the lifetime of our loss averse
agents or, equivalently, that investors are long-lived beyond the VaR horizon. Identical assumptions are
made in Basak and Shapiro (2001), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004), Berkelaar and Kouwenberg
(2006).
22
and Santos (2001), as well as pit identical to the empirical frequency of the cases where
zt ≤ 1 (i.e. of the past gains),
20 we derive VaR∗t+1 according to Equation (2.18) on the
basis of myopic or cumulative cushions. This value is then plugged into Equation (2.10a)
in order to determine the optimal level Bt of borrowing or lending.
Table 1 presents the average percentages of wealth St/Wt invested in the risky port-
folio, for both myopic and cumulative cushions, different portfolio evaluation horizons τ ,
normally and Student-t distributed portfolio returns Rt, and expected returns Et[Rt+1]
computed as unconditional mean of past returns.21 Here, St is derived according to Equa-
tion (2.13).
myopic cushions cumulative cushions
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 32.65 26.18 49.31 44.83
6 months 19.43 15.76 14.18 12.14
4 months 16.12 13.14 19.38 14.96
3 months 12.86 10.50 18.50 13.73
1 month 7.49 6.18 2.05 1.88
1 week 3.78 3.11 0.44 0.39
1 day 1.88 1.54 0.15 0.15
Table 1: Wealth percentages invested in SP500
Accordingly, when investors are loss averse and use the VaR∗t+1 from Equation (2.18)
as measure of the maximal acceptable risk, higher portfolio evaluation frequencies entail
lower investments in the risky portfolio, independent of the way of accounting for past
performance (i.e. myopic or cumulative cushions). This result is consistent with previous
findings, such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001),
i.e. that loss-averse investors who perform high frequency evaluations and narrow-frame
financial projects (by overly focusing on long series of past performances) become ex-
tremely risk averse. In particular for myopic cushions, the risky investment reduces to
20Figures 9 (10) in Appendix 5.1 illustrates the evolution of the probability of accumulating prior
gains pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1) for myopic (cumulative) cushions and for yearly and daily evaluation horizons.
When risky portfolios are evaluated once a year, there is almost no difference if investors use myopic
or cumulative cushions. However, for more frequent evaluations the probability of past gains follows a
similar pattern but remains lower, hence an increased degree of myopia manifested with respect to past
performance diminishes the gain occurrence frequency. Specifically, the mean of pit amounts for myopic
(cumulative) cushions to 0.7812 (0.7689) for yearly and 0.5261 (0.6344) for daily evaluations, reinforcing
the idea that checking portfolios less often increases the percentage of gains made from risky investments.
21Similar results are obtained when expected returns are derived as zero mean or the AR(1) process,
both for myopic and cumulative cushions. See Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix 5.2, as well as Footnote
22 below for further comments. For this reason and since unsophisticated investors (such as our non-
professional traders) usually rely on simple descriptive statistics from past data (and less probable on
more complex econometric models such as zero mean or AR(1)) for formulating return expectations, we
henceforth concentrate on the case when expected returns are derived from average past returns.
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half when switching from yearly to four-monthly evaluations. By contrast, investors using
cumulative cushions turn out to be substantially less risk averse when evaluating their
portfolios once a year. However, as the evaluation frequency increases (i.e. already for
quarterly evaluations), the attractiveness of risky investment is perceived as lower when
past results are accumulated over time than when merely the last period is accounted
for. In essence, investors who use cumulative cushions end up by putting almost all their
money in the risk-free asset (i.e. for daily evaluations).22 Thus, the risk aversion ap-
pears to increase much faster when cushions are based on all previous trades relative to
short-term cushions. Yet, independently of the way the cushions are computed, the risk
aversion of investors appears to be lower for normally than for Student-t distributed port-
folio returns. Interestingly, the yearly results with cumulative cushions under the normal
distribution almost perfectly match the so called TIAA-CREF typical allocation (with
slightly less than 50% as stock investment) mentioned in Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
Henceforth, we proceed in line with Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and rely on
cumulative cushions.23 Given that VaR has been proven to be an adequate market risk
measure for normal distributions, we mostly analyze the case with normally distributed
gross returns.
In a next step, we are interested in the interdependence among risky portfolio returns,
cushions and wealth percentages invested in the risky portfolio. In order to analyze this
issue, we fix the evaluation frequency at one year and plot the annual returns of the
index SP500, the evolution of the cushion St − Zt generated by series of past gains or
losses, and the resulting yearly wealth percentages invested in the risky portfolio. As
mentioned above, the past performance benchmark is set to be the risky investment value
in the previous year Zt = St−1, gross returns are considered as normally distributed, and
expected returns are derived as the unconditional mean of past returns. Figure 1 points
to a positive correlation of the three variables (SP500 yearly returns, yearly cushions, and
yearly percentage investments in the risky portfolio).24 Remember that the sample covers
the last 24 years of analysis (from 03/01/1983 to 03/01/2006), such that every point on
the horizontal time-axis corresponds to the 03/01 of each year. The proportion of wealth
22According to Table 8 in Appendix 5.2, the risky investment becomes exactly zero for daily evaluations
when expected returns are derived as an AR(1) process. Note also that for an AR(1) process there
is almost no difference between the allocations with myopic and cumulative cushions. For zero-mean
expected returns and cumulative cushions, investors start with much higher risky allocations for yearly
evaluations relative to the benchmark case with unconditional-mean return expectations, but at eleven
months these allocations already resemble each other. In the same zero-mean case, but for myopic
cushions, allocations are lower for yearly evaluations and decrease for higher evaluation frequencies but
approach the benchmark more slowly.
23The results of identical tests performed for myopic cushions are available upon request.
24Indeed, the correlation between the SP500-returns and the yearly cushions amounts to 0.6607, the one
between the cushions and the wealth percentage invested in risky assets to 0.6835, while the correlation
between returns and the risky investment yields 0.5484.
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invested in the risky portfolio appears to be mainly generated by the previous bull market
observable in the SP500 returns.25
The importance of the cushion for investor decisions can be traced back to Equation
(2.18) which reveals a twofold structure of the individual VaR*. The first term on the
left-hand side accounts for the expectation of future portfolio returns weighted by the loss
aversion coefficient λ, while the second term is responsible for the influence of previous
performance (as encompassed by the cushion St − Zt). We denote them as the PT-
term and the cushion term, respectively. Accordingly, positive expectations with respect
to the future evolution of the risky portfolio coupled with a positive cushion (i.e. past
gains) should reduce investor aversion to financial losses. Consequently, given that VaR*
directly enters Bt and hence St, the wealth proportion invested in the risky portfolio St/Wt
increases, as illustrated in Figure 1. This effect is reversed when both return expectations
and cushions become negative. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that small changes
in the cushion at the beginning of the effective trade period26 allow for high variations
in the portfolio allocation. This first investor reaction turns strongly against investing
money in risky assets, but the increase in cushions makes it smooth over time, so that it
ends by following fairly close the cushion evolution. This result is again in line with the
concept of loss aversion, i.e. the lower the cushion of wealth accumulated in past trades
is, the more loss-averse investors become because they dispose of less back-up for later
contingent losses. Moreover, this lowers the wealth fraction invested in risky assets.27
At this point, a further interesting empirical question arises: how long does it take
for an investor performing frequent evaluations to quit the risky market? In order to
answer this question, let us further assume that investors start with an initial investment
in risky assets of 50% of the total wealth. Figure 2 points out the dramatic effect of high
evaluation frequencies for investors who act upon cumulative cushions, i.e. when portfolio
performance is checked every single day, investors get out of the risky market in not even
half a year.28 This behavior can also be explained in the context of Equation (2.18),
according to which highly volatile SP500-returns and very low cumulative cushions (as
generated by the daily change in position and apparent in Figure 2) result in an enhanced
acceptable risk level VaR*. This captures the picture of an extremely risk-averse investor.
However, investors with very short memory (one single day) concerning the past portfolio
25Specifically, this proportion reaches its maximum of 53.91% two periods after that SP500-returns
attain a maximum value (which is in 1998), which coincides with the time when the yearly cushion are
highest (i.e. 4775).
26Remember that the effective trade (i.e. the observations that effectively underlie the estimation
procedure) begins at 03/01/1982.
27Gneezy and Potters (1997) test for the influence of experienced gains and losses on risk behavior, but
find no significant effect. However, as noted on p. 641, their experimental framework deviates from real
market settings, as considered in our model.
28In particular, their risky investments decrease from a maximum of 57.49% in the fifth day to 9.86%
in the 14th day, and remain below 1.74% after the day 116.
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Figure 1: Evolution of SP500 returns, myopic and cumulative cushions, and percentages
invested in the risky portfolio for yearly portfolio evaluations
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performance turn out to amass cushions that are higher in absolute value, but vary around
an average of zero. Consequently, as each day can bring substantial change in the perceived
past performance, they constantly allocate a low wealth percentage to risky assets.29
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29The maximum risky investment is 10.26% and corresponds to the outlier found for the October ’87
market crash.
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3.1.2 An analysis with unadjusted VaR*
Finally, we analyze the investor behavior for a VaR* that exclusively accounts for maxi-
mum expected losses, as defined in Equation (2.16). The results confirm the mLA, in the
sense that investors who merely account for the average expected losses in formulating
individual risk constraints decrease their risky investments for higher evaluation frequen-
cies. However, Table 9 in Appendix 5.2 points out that for myopic cushions, the use of
VaR∗1 entails similar risky investments30 relative to the adjusted VaR*. However, notice-
able differences can be observed for cumulative cushions, when VaR∗1-investors start with
lower risky allocations for yearly evaluations than their more sophisticated VaR*-peers,
but reduce their risky investments subject to higher evaluation frequencies more slowly
(faster) up to (above) five months, ending up by investing nothing in risky assets.31 In
essence, the evaluation frequency of one year, which is considered as standard in the lit-
erature, renders the adjustment in the VaR*-formula unimportant with respect to the
wealth percentages dedicated to risky assets.
3.2 The evolution of the prospective value
This section first presents the influence of the evaluation frequency on the prospective
value, then comments on the case when investors account for the “worst case scenario” in
assessing the value of risky investments.
3.2.1 The impact of the portfolio evaluation frequency
According to the results in Section 3.1, the measured performance of the risky portfolio
varies with the evaluation horizon τ . In order to closer analyze the impact and to de-
termine an optimal value of τ (on average over all decision times t), we first recall the
observation made in Section 2.5 that τ exerts direct influence on the expected returns,
thus on the expected return premium Et[xt+1] = Et[Rt+1] − Rft. Therefore, the evalu-
ation time affects the prospective value of the risky investment from Equation (2.23).32
Here, we distinguish between two terms with relevant contribution to the formation of
V (Et[xt+1]), namely the first term on the right hand side of Equation (2.23) that stands
for the prospective value as considered in the original PT (that we denote as the PT-
effect), and the second one (called the cushion effect) generated by the cushions of past
gains or losses suggested in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the prospective value in Equation (2.23) and the
contributions of these two effects, for evaluation frequencies of one year and one day,
30Specifically, these investments are only slightly lower on average.
31The risky investment already amounts to zero for a two-month evaluation horizon.
32The effects of the alternative prospective value definition (2.24) are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
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respectively. Recall that cushions cumulate from the beginning of the trade and investors
anticipate normally distributed gross returns. On first inspection of the panel (a) in
Figure 3, we find that the prospective value V (Et[xt+1]) relies on the PT-effect only at
the beginning of the trade, as investors do not dispose of sufficient monetary provisions.
Once positive cushions started to accumulate, the cushion effect clearly plays the lead
role in the perceived risky value. This leading is even more pronounced for daily portfolio
evaluations (panel b), where the cushion effect actually overlays the prospective value,
the PT-effect being almost nil.33
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Figure 3: Prospective value evolution for daily and yearly evaluations
In the subsequent Figure 4, we now plot the prospective value and its two components
(the PT- and the cushion effect) as functions of the evaluation horizon τ , which ranges
from one month to eight years, namely in monthly increments of up to one year and yearly
increments thereafter.34 As expected, the perceived riskiness of financial investments
decreases as investors perform rarer evaluations. An apparent puzzling result is that V
looms negative at the frequency of two years. There is one particularity of our market
33Specifically, the mean PT-effect amounts to −0.0066.
34In order to obtain a suggestive graphic representation, we consider all frequencies from one to twelve
months and discard the observations for one day and one week. An evaluation frequency of eight years
implies that investors can only make three portfolio checks during our estimating sample. Therefore, a
further increase of the evaluation time becomes senseless.
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data that may have driven this result, namely that the two-year SP500-(log)returns turn
out to be extremely variable (see Figure 11 in Appendix 5.3). These repeated changes of
direction render investor decisions very difficult and result in negative values, because the
non-professional investors are not able to cumulate positive cushions.35
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Figure 4: Prospective value evolution for different evaluation frequencies
The evolution of the prospective value in the evaluation horizon domain depicted in
Figure 4 turns out to exhibit two distinct segments of different evolution, delimitated by an
evaluation frequency of around one year, where a kink becomes apparent. This reinforces
the idea that in practice, one year indeed represents a “critical” evaluation frequency.
As documented in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), a decade ago (non-professional) investors
actually used to perform yearly portfolios checks. Nowadays, due to the high amount of
information available at almost no cost and to the enhanced dynamic of market events,
we claim that a tendency to reconsider the problem of splitting their money between risky
and risk-free assets more often becomes manifest. Thus, investor perceptions sooner lie
in the left segment of the curve in Figure 4 (on which our subsequent analysis focus on
as well). Yet, one year remains an important anchor in the investor minds given that,
on one hand, various events (such as release of annual activity reports) take place with
this frequency and, on the other hand, non-professional investors may not be sufficiently
impatient (perhaps because they do not dispose of sufficient time and financial resources)
to perform portfolio checks more often.
The apparent segmentation of the prospective value for evaluation frequencies lower
vs. higher than one year motivates us to have a closer look at the two separate evaluation
frequency segments illustrated in Figure 5. We attempt to finding an analytical form that
underlies this evolution and that would allow us to conjecture upon an optimal evaluation
frequency.
35Moreover, the problem gets worse since we have only twelve observations.
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Figure 5: Prospective value evolution on the two relevant evaluation frequency segments
For our usual case with λ = 2.25 and k = 3, the analytical functionals that best match
the prospective value data V (τ) in Figure 5 consist of a third-order polynomial for τ ≤ 1
year and a fourth-order one for τ ≥ 1 year. The corresponding estimates of the curvature
coefficients are given in Table 10 in Appendix 5.3. In addition, similar courses are found for
further degrees of narrow framing such as k ∈ {0; 10; 20}, as illustrated in the subsequent
Figure 12. In the left evaluation horizon segment, this analytical representation points out
a three-stage evolution of the perceived risky value subject to higher evaluation frequencies
(i.e. that reach from one month to one year). In other words, it appears that going from
monthly to four-monthly evaluations entails substantial advances of the prospective value.
Yet, a further increase in the evaluation frequency from five to ten months exhibits a much
lower impact on the variation of V . Finally, when non-professional investors decrease the
frequency of portfolio evaluation from ten months to one year, they perceive again higher
and faster increasing prospective values. In the right segment, the evolution is more
complex, but again middle-range evaluation frequencies (between four and seven years)
demand lower variations of the prospective value. However, this more complex course may
be in part determined by the negative V obtained at the two-years evaluation horizon.
We also note the resulting jump (kink) in the prospective value at what we consider to
be the reference frequency of τ = 1 year that complies with the idea of loss aversion.36
Section 5.3 in the Appendix summarizes some results of the various sensitivity checks
performed for further values of the loss aversion coefficient λ and of the past-losses sen-
sitivity parameter k.37 Tables 11, 12, and 13 present the prospective value evolution for
the entire range of considered parameter values. As in practice it is less plausible that
investors revise their portfolios less often than once a year, we briefly comment on the
36Specifically for λ = 2.25 and k = 3, V (1 year−) = 6, 519.56 6= 6, 273.3 = V (1 year+)). Many authors
consider the loss aversion to be defined by the kink of the value function at the reference point. See
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004), or Ko¨bberling and Wakker
(2005) among others.
37Further results are available on request.
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findings for evaluation frequencies higher than one year (i.e. in the left evaluation hori-
zon segment) in the sequel. First, the fitted curves for this segment depicted in Figures
12(a) and 13(a) emphasize the fact that while for λ = 2.25 the perceived risky value does
not appear to change much subject to a higher sensitivity to past losses k, the reactions
of investors showing different degrees of loss aversion (as measured by the index λ) are
distinct for a fixed k = 3. In the latter case (i.e. k = 3), the third-order polynomial
specification provides an acceptable fit for λ ≤ 2.25 (namely, it explains more than 70%
variation in the data as measured by the adjusted R2). However, for high degrees of loss
aversion (λ = 3) only a sixth-degree polynomial reaches an adjusted R2 of over 40%.
Moreover, while “veritable” loss-averse investors (with λ > 1) perceive risky investments
to be more attractive as they perform evaluations less often, investors with λ ≤ 1 manifest
the opposed tendency towards a more favorable perception for more frequent evaluations.
Clearly, the reversal takes place for the “neutral” case with λ = 1, where the prospective
value turns out to be low and less variable. Also, the variation of V over the evaluation
horizon increased subject to higher values of the loss aversion coefficient λ. As expected in
almost all cases with λ ≥ 138, the maximum V is to be found for the maximal evaluation
horizon of the left segment, which is one year.
Returning to the question concerning the optimal evaluation frequency, it appears
natural to assume that investors who are exclusively concerned with financial investments
(and not with other sources of utility such as consumption) attempt to maximize the
prospective value of their risky portfolios. Smart investors could look for an optimal
evaluation frequency, i.e. one that maximizes the prospective value (at a given decision
time t or analogously on average).39 The functional form fitted to our data set for the
prospective value in Appendix 5.3 (see again Table 10 and Figure 12) for the left evaluation
horizon segment (i.e. τ ≤ 1 year), show that loss-averse investors (with λ ≥ 1) perceive
the investment value as being maximal for the maximal evaluation time of this domain,
i.e. one year. As mentioned above, we consider this segment as the sole one relevant
in practice.40 In the same spirit, the highest evaluation frequency of one day entails a
minimal expected value of the risky portfolio, pushing investors to step out of the risky
market and to allocate (almost) all their money to risk-free assets. In other words, loss-
averse investors should check the performance of their risky investments as seldom as
38Only in the extreme case with λ = 3, the values of V at ten monthly evaluations are higher for all
considered k-values.
39Actually, the optimality of the evaluation frequency should be sooner understood from the viewpoint
of portfolio managers, whose interest is to attract more clients willing to invest money in risky assets.
Recommending these clients undertake performance checks in the “optimal” frequency should maximize
the budget at managers’ disposal. In the same context, Gneezy and Potters (1997) suggest that managers
could manipulate the evaluation period of prospective clients.
40For the right segment (i.e. τ ≥ 1 year), the fitted polynomials exhibit a maximum at the lowest
evaluation frequency of eight years and a local one between four and five years.
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possible in order to maximize the corresponding prospective value of their investments.
Under practical informational constraints that govern financial markets nowadays,41 one
year appears to be the most reasonable evaluation time that would increase the perceived
returns of risky investments.
3.2.2 An analysis under the “worst case scenario”
For the “worst case scenario” described in Section 2.4, investors may use a slightly different
definition of the prospective value, as suggested in Equation (2.24). Figure 6 plots the
evolution of both Vt+1 in line with the original PT and the new V
∗
t+1. Apparently, the
latter is smaller and less variable but follows the same qualitative pattern.42 Thus, the
discussion on the evolution of the prospective value in the evaluation frequency domain
conducted in Section 3.2.1 should also be valid in the “worst case scenario”, at least in
qualitative terms. Thus, the hypothesis that prudent investors perceive risks according to
this “worst case” appears to be acceptably realistic (at least in the domain of evaluation
frequencies) because it generates result patterns that are similar to those stemming from
considerations of the original PT.
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
−2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
V
V*
Figure 6: Prospective value V vs. the “worst case scenario” V ∗ for cumulative cushions
and yearly evaluations
41Such as the huge amount of financial data available at almost no cost to each individual investor and
the high interest raised by financial events in general. These natural market conditions entail an increase
in the evaluation frequency below the limit of one year, such that investor perceptions lie sooner in the
left evaluation-horizon domain and the crossover to the second segment is improbable.
42Indeed, the mean V¯ = 6955.5 while V¯ ∗ = 2626.7.
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3.3 The evolution of the actual attitude towards financial losses
In this section, we address the question of how the attitude of non-professional investors,
as captured by the LAi from Equation (2.14) and the gRA from Equation (2.25), vary
subject to different portfolio evaluation frequencies. As discussed in Section 2.5, this
variation reflects an indirect impact in the sense that it does not directly result from the
changes of the equity premium with τ , but on the collateral influence of τ on other model
parameters such as the cushion St − Zt and the probability of past gains pit. For both
LAi and gRA, we conduct empirical investigations similar to the above analysis on the
prospective value.
3.3.1 The impact of the portfolio evaluation frequency on the loss aversion
index
In the traditional PT-framework, the index of loss aversion LAi reduces to the simple
coefficient of loss aversion λ (when the curvatures of the gain and loss branches of the value
function are identical), hence it does not change with the portfolio evaluation frequency.
The myopic loss aversion addresses the joint effect of this (fixed) index and the variation
of returns due to more frequent evaluations. By contrast, in our extended framework the
LAi itself fluctuates subject to the revision frequency and this effect overlaps the return
variation resulting in perceptions of the risky investment that depend on the evaluation
horizon. Thus, it is interesting to observe the evolution of the actual attitude towards
losses subject to different portfolio evaluation frequencies. In particular, the LAi defined in
Equation (2.14) exhibits the same twofold formal representation as the prospective value.
A first term corresponding to the PT-effect consists of the coefficient of loss aversion λ and
a second one is analogous to the cushion effect and depends on the relative cushion 1− zt,
on the sensitivity to past losses k, and on the probability of past losses 1−pit. Clearly, for
positive but small cushions and low k-values (i.e. k ≤ 3), the first term dominates and
renders investors more reluctant to losses for higher λ.
We commence by analyzing the LAi-evolution for our benchmark case with λ = 2.25
and k = 3, the course of which is depicted in Figure 7. Apparently, LAi slightly increases
on average for lower evaluation frequencies, a tendency that may appear counterintuitive
at first. However, note that investors who check the performance of their risky portfolios
less often (e.g. once every three years) and detect losses should become more averse to
losses in general, as they have less flexibility in changing the portfolio composition to avoid
future losses (e.g. the next evaluation will be undertaken only after three more years and
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investors have to bear the losses during the next three years).43
Figures 14 and 15 in Appendix 5.4 illustrate the LAi evolution for λ = 2.25 and
different values of k, as well as for k = 3 and different λ, respectively. As expected, LAi
does not vary much subject to the coefficient of loss aversion λ for a fixed k and for k = 0,
it reduces to the simple coefficient of loss aversion λ. Yet, LAi becomes sensitive to the
choice of the parameter describing the reaction intensity to past losses k. Surprisingly,
it appears to diminish for increasing values of the sensitivity to past losses k. Also, for
k > 0, LAi takes values that are always lower than the coefficient of loss aversion λ (or
equivalently than LAi in the case with k = 0). This reaction originates in Equation (2.14)
and the fact that the absolute cushion 1−zt is on average positive for almost all considered
evaluation frequencies.44 When non-professional investors impose high penalties on past
losses (i.e. k is big) and the current state is indeed a loss, they become extremely loss
averse, which is formally equivalent to the fact that LAi substantially grows to exceed
λ. However, when the current state is a gain and positive cushions have so far been
accumulated (i.e. the average past performance is positive), investor perception cannot
be characterized by extreme values of k. In fact, there is no meaningful interpretation of
the case with high k and past positive cushions, although it can be represented formally
(as in Figure 14). The practical importance of our graphical illustrations refers to cases
when negative cushions are coupled with current losses and we can observe how LAi grows
for higher k-values.45 Table 14 in Appendix 5.4 attempts to distinguish among practically
relevant and irrelevant cases.
Moreover, in the left segment (i.e. high evaluation frequency) LAi turns out to be
more variable the higher the λ-values and exhibits local minima (maxima) at one and
ten (three and eight) months. This pattern extends over the right segment for portfolio
evaluations more frequent than once every four years and is reversed for lower evaluation
frequencies. A local minimum (maximum) becomes manifest around two (six) years. Note
that for higher k-values, the LAi for ten months is almost as low as the global minimum
of LAi obtained for the lowest evaluation horizon of one month, which meets the findings
in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), who refer to ten months as to the evaluation period that
explains the equity premium observed in practice when investors use a piecewise linear
value function and linear probability weights.
As in Section 3.2.1, we perform separate fitting procedures for each of the two evalua-
43Of course, this situation can lead the investors to increase their portfolio revision frequency. However,
this is an open question that we left for future research.
44For λ = 2.25 and k = 3, there are only two negative mean values at five and six years. See Figure
16 in Appendix 5.4. At these two frequencies (which are in essence of no practical interest), LAi indeed
increases for higher k, as apparent in Figure 14.
45As stressed above, this is the case for five and six yearly portfolio evaluations in Figure 14 for λ = 2.25
and k = 3.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the loss aversion index on the two relevant evaluation frequency
segments
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tion horizon segments (i.e. lower and higher than one year).46 Table 15 in Appendix 5.4
presents the estimated fitting coefficients for λ = 2.25 and k = 3. The simplest specifi-
cation describing quite well the evolution of LAi on each of the two evaluation frequency
segments is a third-degree polynomial.47 For λ = 2.25, while to the left of the evaluation
horizon of one year the LAi grows with τ , its form reminds of a sinusoid to the right of the
reference point, where this pattern is more pronounced due to the enhanced sensitivity to
past losses as described by k. The local extremal points are clearly not as pronounced as
for the raw courses in Figure 14. However, the overall minimum is obtained at the max-
imum evaluation frequency of one month, then there is another local minimum between
nine and ten months (between one and two years) in the left (right) segment.48 Note that
this evolution pattern fitted for different k-values in our usual case with λ = 2.25 persists
for λ = 3, but is reverted for coefficients of loss aversion which are implausible according
to PT (and denote the opposite of loss averse investors) λ ≤ 1.49
3.3.2 The impact of the portfolio evaluation frequency on the global first-
order risky aversion
Motivated by the above findings concerning the evolution of LAi as a function of the
evaluation horizon τ , we now turn our attention to the second measure of the loss atti-
tude introduced in the theoretical part, namely the gRA. As stressed in the theoretical
part of our paper, the gRA per unit of current risky holdings (St) represents a linear
transformation of LAi. Being derived from the prospective value, it also encompasses
some further more general elements such as the probabilities of current gains and losses.
We expect that the same intuition holds and the gRA shows similar but somewhat less
complex structure in the two evaluation frequency segments.
As illustrated in Figure 8 for our usual case with λ = 2.25 and k = 3, and in Figures
17 and 18 in Appendix 5.4 for further values of those two parameters, the gRA course
follows the main evolution pattern observed for LAi. It increases slightly for lower portfolio
evaluation frequencies, as well as subject to the coefficient of loss aversion λ for a fixed
sensitivity to past losses k. However, gRA turns to be more sensitive to the variation of λ
46Further numerical results are available upon request.
47In terms of the adjusted R2, this specification explains over 70% of the data variation in each of
the analyzed cases with moderate levels of λ and k. Exceptions are some of the cases with very high
k in the high evaluation frequency segment, such as λ = 0.5 and k = 20, where the third-polynomial
merely achieves an adjusted R2 of 45.61%. Also, for λ = 3, the cubic polynomial provides the best fit
but explains only between 50− 60% of the data variation for all k in this segment. Interesting to note is
that in the case that can be considered as “neutral” in terms of the loss aversion coefficient λ = 1, simple
lines already provide a good description of the LAi for highly frequent portfolio revisions.
48In particular, the evaluation horizon (in months) at which the LAi in the left segment is minimal
amounts to 9.6169 for k = 3, 9.4316 for k = 10, and 9.0406 for k = 20. The same values (in years) for
the minima in the right segment are 1.9498 for k = 3, 1.8328 for k = 10, and 1.6204 for k = 20.
49Specifically for λ ∈ {0.5; 1}, LAi exhibits negative slope in the left segment.
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compared to the LAi, given that it decreases in k for a fixed λ as long as portfolio revisions
are performed more often than every four years. From this viewpoint, the gRA reflects
more accurately the attitude of investors who heavily penalize past losses (i.e. exhibit a
high k) and who become more averse to financial losses in general. For λ = 2.25, the
global minimum of gRA is again attained for the highest evaluation horizon of one month
and, local minima in the left (right) segment are found for two, six, and ten months (two
years) portfolio evaluations for k ≤ 10 and at four and ten months (one and four years)
for k = 20. The negative values of gRA for k = 20 easily result from the Definition (2.25),
where for positive cushions and high sensitivity to past losses k but moderate loss aversion
coefficient λ, the second term (in the middle expression) dominates the first PT-equivalent
term and becomes negative. Hence, in practice investors may be hardly as averse to past
losses as suggested by k > 10 (at least when experiencing past gains on average, as it is
the case for our data set).
1m 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
x 104
(a) All evaluation frequencies
1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 7m 8m 9m 10m 11m 1y
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 104
(b) τ ≤ 1 year
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
x 104
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Figure 8: Evolution of the global first-order risk aversion on the two relevant evaluation
frequency segments
Third-degree polynomials appear to fit the left evaluation horizon segment acceptably
well for our standard case with λ = 2.25, at least for moderate sensitivity to past losses
(k ≤ 10). For k = 20, the evolution of gRA turns to be more complex and variable,
with a minimum at quarterly portfolio evaluations, but in line with the above arguments
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and with the corresponding considerations with respect to LAi we can consider this case
as implausible in practice. These findings are similar to the evolution of the prospective
value for evaluation frequencies higher than one year. Thus, the gRA appears to increase
faster at the ends of the left segment, namely for evaluations performed more often than
once every four months as well as between eight months and one year.50 In the right
segment, linear specifications are already sufficient for describing the evolution of gRA.
The estimated coefficients for k = 3 are given in Table 15. These results hold for all the
other considered values of the loss aversion coefficient.51
In sum, we can conclude that LAi and gRA effectively represent improvements over
the common loss aversion coefficient λ, as they address additional factors that impact
on the loss attitude such as past performance and expectations about the future market
conditions. Thus, the above analysis offers a more complete picture over the causes and
manifestations of how this attitude towards financial losses fluctuates subject to different
portfolio evaluation frequencies.
3.4 A comparison with the portfolio optimization framework
This section proposes to translate the results obtained in our framework (where investors
subjectively derive the maximum acceptable level of losses) in terms of the portfolio opti-
mization “language” spoken by professional managers. To this end, we calculate equivalent
significance levels and equivalent average indices of loss aversion that correspond to the
VaR* derived according to our model and imposed as fixed risk constraints in the portfolio
optimization problem.
3.4.1 VaR*-equivalent significance levels
One further question of interest arises from the use of the VaR∗ as a measure of risk in
the portfolio optimization model in Section 2.1. Statistically, VaR∗ represents the lower
quantile of portfolio returns at a given (i.e. fixed) significance level α (or confidence level
1 − α), where usually α ∈ [1, 10]%. The individually optimal VaR∗t+1 that is previously
derived by investors on the basis of subjective considerations according to Equation (2.18)
is compared to the portfolio VaR in Equation (2.10b), in order to determine how investor
wealth is going to be split between the risky portfolio and the risk-free bond (where the
sum to be invested in risk-free assets is formalized in Equation (2.10a)). We denote by
α∗t the significance level that corresponds to the VaR
∗
t+1 computed in our model. Thus,
if the portfolio VaR at time t corresponds to an α > α∗t (or equivalently, to a confidence
50The inflexion points of the fitted polynomial for λ = 2.25 and k = 3 lie at 4.4746 and 7.3503 months.
51For all considered values of λ, the adjusted R2 lies over 75%. For k = 20, only fourth-degree
polynomials achieve adjusted R2 of over 40%. However, for λ = 1 simple lines explain more than 75% of
the data variation.
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level 1− α < 1− α∗t ), then the sign of Equation (2.10a) is negative. In other words, too
much risk would arise by putting the entire wealth in the risky portfolio, so that, in order
to accommodate the desired (lower) risk level, a percentage of the investor wealth should
be lent, i.e. invested in the risk-free asset (Bt < 0). On the contrary, if α < α
∗
t , then
the portfolio risk meets the individual risk requirements (being lower than the subjective
risk threshold) and investors borrow extra money (Bt > 0) in order to increase their
SP500-holdings.
In this section, we determine the significance levels corresponding to the values of
VaR∗t+1 derived from Equation (2.18) for normally and Student-t distributed gross returns
and cumulative cushions.
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t
1 year 0.00 0.00
6 months 0.00 0.00
4 months 0.00 0.00
3 months 0.00 0.00
1 month 0.00 0.00
1 week 0.00 0.00
1 day 0.00 0.00
Table 2: Portfolio-equivalent significance levels of the estimated VaR∗t+1 (α
∗).
Table 2 presents equivalent significance levels averaged over time (α∗) and provides
striking results. As stated above, classical portfolio selection models based on VaR assume
that investors chose significance levels α in the interval [1, 10]%. Our findings show that for
any evaluation frequency higher than one year, this assumption does not comply with real
market data as the equivalent significance level α∗ lies below the theoretically acceptable
interval (being practically zero). Thus, even the lowest significance level of 1% proposed
in standard portfolio optimization models is not able to capture the risk aversion of non-
professional investors acting according to our setting. In other words, investors may be
substantially more risk averse in practice than considered in theory.
3.4.2 Portfolio-equivalent indices of loss aversion
The previous section shows that non-professional investors who are influenced by their
personal history of gains and losses and in general behave according to the assumptions of
our model are more risk averse than commonly described by in terms of significance levels
α ∈ [1, 10]%. In the same context, we now address the impact of an exogenous VaR* as
originally employed in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), on the values of the loss
aversion coefficient λ∗¯t+1, computed according to Equation (2.22) in our model. To this
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end, we go back to the conventional significance levels of 1% and 10% and estimate an
homologous exogenous VaR* as derived from Equation (2.10b) that would correspond to
the portfolio VaR at one of these two significance levels. This equivalent VaR* serves to
compute λ∗¯t+1 according to Equation (2.22).
Tables 3 and 4 present equivalent wealth percentages that would be invested in the
risky portfolio at the two significance levels mentioned above (1% and 10%, respectively)
but are obtained imposing VaR*-values that result from our model. Remember that the
portfolio VaR in Equation (2.10b) is estimated using a 5% significance level that is going
to be considered as the benchmark for the values in these tables (i.e. it corresponds to
100% risky investments). The same tables also show the average equivalent coefficient of
loss aversion λ∗¯ and consider the cases with normally or Student-t distributed portfolio
returns and cumulative cushions.
Wealth % λ∗¯
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 69.10 47.65 0.91 0.83
6 months 65.54 42.53 0.97 0.97
4 months 64.48 41.04 0.97 0.97
3 months 63.43 39.59 0.97 0.97
1 month 61.64 37.12 0.98 0.99
1 week 60.14 35.10 1.07 0.99
1 day 59.35 34.05 1.00 1.00
Table 3: Wealth percentages invested in SP500 and the average λ∗¯, for α = 0.01
Wealth % λ∗¯
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 116.47 120.91 0.68 1.12
6 months 118.37 122.95 1.09 1.09
4 months 118.94 123.55 1.12 1.09
3 months 119.49 124.13 1.15 1.08
1 month 120.45 125.11 1.09 1.07
1 week 121.25 125.92 1.02 1.02
1 day 121.67 126.34 1.01 1.02
Table 4: Wealth percentages invested in SP500 and the average λ∗¯, for α = 0.10
Accordingly, the equivalent recommendations from our model at 1% (10%) significance
lie well below (above) the benchmark VaR at 5%. This points out a higher (lower) risk
aversion in our endogenous VaR*-framework (after restating it in terms of the exogenous-
41
VaR model) relative to the portfolio risk measured by VaR. Comparing Tables 3 and 4,
we can observe that the lower the significance level (or the higher the confidence level) the
more risk averse is the non-professional investor, i.e. the proportion of wealth invested in
the risky portfolio is smaller than 100%. However, even the lowest percentages in Table
3 are still much higher than those in Table 1, where VaR* is treated as endogenous. In-
terestingly, the results for α = 1% are consistent with our previous findings supporting
the mLA, as the wealth percentage invested in risky assets decreases for higher evalua-
tion frequencies. By contrast, when α increases to 10%, this phenomenon is reversed and
investors appear to allocate more money to the risky portfolio for more frequent evalua-
tions. As mLA is a widely documented phenomenon, we can conclude that the traditional
portfolio optimization framework fails once more to capture the real investor behavior in
a consistent way.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the loss aversion coefficient λ∗¯ derived for conven-
tional significance levels assumed in previous research, the values of which are much lower
than 2.25, the empirical level estimated in the original PT and largely used in previous
empirical research.52 For the majority of the considered combinations of α-values and
evaluation frequencies, we obtain λ∗¯ ≃ 1, a level that indicates identical perception over
gains and losses according to the value function from Equations (2.11) and (2.12) (and
recalling that k = 0). Actually, this “neutral” level of one is exceeded merely for high eval-
uation frequencies, namely over one week (six months) for α = 1% (10%). This reinforces
our earlier claim that even assuming low significance levels (for example α = 1% as is the
common case in previous portfolio optimization research) entails an underestimation of
the loss attitude of real investors captured by the specific coefficient λ.
4 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we investigate the risk behavior of non-professional investors facing problems
of fixing a maximal acceptable level of financial losses and of splitting money between risk-
free assets and a risky portfolio (capital allocation). We assume that these investors are
loss averse, narrowly frame financial investments and perceive future portfolio returns as
being influenced by past portfolio performance.
We extend the portfolio allocation model developed in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk
(2001) in order to incorporate the effect of a desired VaR* that is now subjectively as-
sessed by individual loss-averse investors. Thus, the first task of non-professional investors
consists of fixing a VaR*-level that is subsequently communicated to professional portfolio
managers in charge of finding the optimal portfolio composition. The portfolio optimiza-
52Such as Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
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tion procedure also delivers the optimal sum of money to be invested in risk-free assets,
which represents another important decision variable for the non-professional investor.
In modeling the investor’s perception over the risky investment that yields the subjec-
tive VaR*, we rely on the notion of myopic loss aversion introduced in Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) and employ the extended subjective valuation of prospective risky investments pro-
posed in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). We integrate these behavioral explanations
in the portfolio decision framework mentioned above, enriching the two models with orig-
inal findings that stem both from theoretical consideration and empirical results obtained
on the basis of real market data (such as SP500 and US 10-year bond price series).
Considering that investors are merely concerned with financial investments as source
of utility, we theoretically model their perceptions regarding the utility of risky assets
and define the maximum individually sustainable level of financial losses VaR*. This
level serves in deciding upon the optimal amount of money to be invested in the risky
portfolio. Also, we assess the utility of risky prospects captured by the prospective value
and apply an extended definition of loss aversion (residing in the loss aversion index
according to Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) as well as a coefficient of global first-order
risk aversion) that attempts to better capture the actual attitude towards financial losses
of real investors. Moreover, we investigate the influence of different evaluation frequencies
on the prospective value and on the actual loss attitude and point out a way to derive an
optimal horizon of performance revisions under consideration of practical constraints.
The theoretical results are supported and extended by our empirical findings which,
in sum, show that non-professional investors allocate the main part of their wealth to
risk-free assets. A smaller sum is put into the risky portfolio for increased frequencies of
revising its performance. Also, financial wealth fluctuations determined by the success of
previous decisions exert a significant impact on the current portfolio allocation, making
investors without substantial gain cushions firmly refuse holding risky assets. One year
appears to be a critical evaluation frequency, optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing
risky holdings and commonly used in practice. This evaluation frequency splits individual
perceptions over risky investments (captured by the prospective value) and over finan-
cial losses in general (captured by the loss aversion index and the global first-order risk
aversion) into two qualitatively different segments with distinct evolutions. Moreover, the
computation of equivalent values of the significance level and of the loss aversion coefficient
that correspond to confidence levels commonly assumed in previous research suggests an
underestimation of the attitude of real non-professional investors to financial losses.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Descriptive statistics and the probability of prior gains
SP500
Evaluation frequency
Quarterly Yearly
Mean 0.017 0.066
Median 0.018 0.071
Std.Dev. 0.079 0.136
Kurtosis 2.661 -0.9659
Skewness -0.671 -0.205
Max. 0.290 0.345
Min. -0.302 -0.207
Obs. 175 43
Table 5: Log-difference of the SP500 index for quarterly and yearly portfolio evaluations
10-year
Evaluation frequency
Quarterly Yearly
Mean 0.017 0.073
Median 0.017 0.070
Std.Dev. 0.006 0.026
Kurtosis 0.623 0.974
Skewness 0.951 1.042
Max. 0.036 0.142
Min. 0.009 0.037
Obs. 175 43
Table 6: 10-year bond return for quarterly and yearly portfolio evaluations
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Figure 9: Evolution of the probability of prior gains pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1) for myopic cushions
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Figure 10: Evolution of the probability of prior gains pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1) for cumulative
cushions
45
5.2 The wealth percentages invested in SP500
myopic cushions cumulative cushions
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 19.89 17.53 46.96 40.12
6 months 13.17 11.43 14.75 12.65
4 months 12.27 10.53 29.81 22.83
3 months 10.23 8.72 28.05 20.65
1 month 6.49 5.49 1.99 1.90
1 week 3.52 2.94 0.43 0.38
1 day 1.82 1.50 0.15 0.15
Table 7: Percentage investment in SP500 for expected returns = zero mean
myopic cushions cumulative cushions
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 39.97 32.65 38.00 38.00
6 months 26.16 20.52 26.68 20.13
4 months 19.01 15.20 37.87 27.87
3 months 14.33 11.62 34.86 23.67
1 month 7.79 6.42 2.13 1.93
1 week 3.82 3.13 0.00 0.00
1 day 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 8: Percentage investment in SP500 for expected returns = AR(1)
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myopic cushions cumulative cushions
Evaluation frequency
Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 25.34 21.18 47.04 43.41
6 months 16.62 13.85 26.84 26.30
4 months 14.45 12.09 8.27 7.80
3 months 11.89 9.86 7.86 6.82
1 month 7.20 5.96 0.00 0.00
1 week 3.73 3.07 0.00 0.01
1 day 1.91 1.55 0.00 0.00
Table 9: Wealth percentages invested in SP500 using VaR∗1
5.3 The prospective value as a function of the portfolio evalua-
tion frequency
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Figure 11: Two-year SP500 returns for λ = 2.25 and k = 3
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Fitted model
Coefficient 95%-confidence
Goodness of fit
estimates interval
τ ≤ 1 year
a3 = 30.22 (12.37, 48.08)
a3τ
3 + a2τ
2 a2 = −568.4 (−920.5,−216.4) R
2: 0.8143
+a1τ + a0 a1 = 3, 220 (1, 210, 5, 230) Adjusted R
2: 0.7446
a0 = −2, 491 (−5, 634, 652.6) RMSE: 833.1
τ ≥ 1 year
b4 = 275.3 (41.69, 508.9)
b4τ
4 + b3τ
3 b3 = −4, 842 (−9, 067,−617.7) R
2: 0.9558
+b2τ
2 + b1τ + b0 b2 = 29, 220 (3, 222, 55, 220) Adjusted R
2: 0.8968
b1 = −67, 200 (−129, 500,−4, 861) RMSE: 3,123
b0 = 48, 820 (2, 217, 95, 420)
Table 10: Estimated prospective value evolution as a function of the portfolio evaluation
frequency for λ = 2.25, k = 3
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(a) τ ≤ 1 year: third-order polynomials
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(b) τ ≥ 1 year: fourth-order polynomials
Figure 12: Curve-fitting for the prospective value on the two relevant evaluation
frequency segments for λ = 2.25 and k ∈ {0; 3; 10; 20}
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(a) τ ≤ 1 year: third-order polynomials
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(b) τ ≥ 1 year: fourth-order polynomials
Figure 13: Curve-fitting for the prospective value on the two relevant evaluation
frequency segments for λ ∈ {0.5; 1; 2.25; 3} and k = 3
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Evaluation frequency
1 day 1 week 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months
λ = 0.5
k = 0 -22.41 -774.78 -946.11 -558.91 -828.40 -1072.19 -871.46
k = 3 -23.55 -809.63 -846.89 -532.06 -843.84 -1116.66 -863.46
k = 10 -23.23 -829.60 -900.71 -471.98 -973.28 -1386.02 -916.78
k = 20 -27.13 -873.80 -666.05 -567.40 -1024.00 -1876.70 -923.65
λ = 1
k = 0 0.00 -0.04 0.46 2.23 6.20 11.23 21.66
k = 3 -0.03 -0.25 -2.14 -4.69 -5.89 -11.38 -5.37
k = 10 -0.09 -0.72 -7.54 -17.87 -30.84 -54.14 -54.62
k = 20 -0.18 -1.37 -12.87 -25.24 -45.00 -87.87 -78.91
λ = 2.25
k = 0 17.03 61.20 294.14 1322.08 3563.08 3631.33 2933.67
k = 3 17.11 62.11 305.26 1296.84 3597.88 3640.67 2796.66
k = 10 17.48 64.56 319.82 1278.58 3618.99 3693.37 2569.44
k = 20 17.65 67.39 360.72 1217.59 3404.81 3940.34 2437.73
λ = 3
k = 0 -44107.17 72.67 357.35 2296.12 8591.95 8271.97 5150.70
k = 3 -21085.72 74.13 364.20 2317.36 9735.66 7004.40 4961.41
k = 10 32626.32 74.94 439.08 2341.81 12750.13 8266.93 4633.40
k = 20 109346.83 78.37 491.56 2679.36 12763.28 6991.29 6449.35
Table 11: Prospective value evolution for evaluation frequencies up to five months and
different parameter values
49
Evaluation frequency
6 months 7 months 8 months 9 months 10 months 11 months 12 months
λ = 0.5
k = 0 -1115.90 -993.57 -1028.76 -1097.26 -1023.67 -1268.19 -2467.59
k = 3 -1083.11 -920.89 -1023.88 -1071.85 -1038.19 -1350.60 -2984.25
k = 10 -1034.21 -603.16 -1017.94 -1074.05 -1069.67 -1541.96 -4147.73
k = 20 -949.35 -447.25 -941.04 -1218.97 -929.38 -1440.39 -343.41
λ = 1
k = 0 32.16 1.42 38.99 42.88 69.67 58.28 2.97
k = 3 -13.75 -27.26 -9.02 -14.41 -12.32 -26.87 -91.19
k = 10 -85.66 -73.11 -86.00 -119.63 -125.29 -149.24 -265.29
k = 20 -106.93 -95.89 -109.68 -139.73 -176.94 -221.82 -296.50
λ = 2.25
k = 0 2241.31 2181.99 2805.10 3647.67 2449.35 3837.94 5933.59
k = 3 2120.01 2042.33 3490.35 3423.85 2237.29 3772.57 6955.50
k = 10 1793.25 1610.40 3192.06 3170.63 1804.37 3783.51 8750.43
k = 20 1876.08 929.33 4151.86 3949.50 1441.88 3824.06 10263.26
λ = 3
k = 0 3399.66 3414.29 4293.73 7173.57 3687.13 5054.86 7520.72
k = 3 3214.24 3222.21 3669.12 8055.53 3483.86 5052.01 5454.59
k = 10 2694.63 2682.72 5136.55 9095.14 2980.94 6798.98 9325.27
k = 20 3153.57 -654.15 6899.74 8882.01 2315.59 7142.13 8458.05
Table 12: Prospective value evolution for evaluation frequencies from six months τ ≤ 1
year and different parameter values
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Evaluation frequency
2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years
λ = 0.5
k = 0 -3011.96 -3082.98 -4964.06 -7691.76 -6554.58 -8661.21 -10830.26
k = 3 -3011.96 -3082.98 -4964.06 -7691.76 -6554.58 -8661.21 -10830.26
k = 10 -3011.96 -3082.98 -4964.06 -7691.76 -6554.58 -8661.21 -10830.26
k = 20 -3011.96 -3082.98 -4964.06 -7691.76 -6554.58 -8661.21 -10830.26
λ = 1
k = 0 78.63 266.14 -513.17 -146.00 1526.51 796.55 -1022.60
k = 3 78.63 266.14 -513.17 -146.00 1526.51 796.55 -1022.60
k = 10 78.63 266.14 -513.17 -146.00 1526.51 796.55 -1022.60
k = 20 78.63 266.14 -513.17 -146.00 1526.51 796.55 -1022.60
λ = 2.25
k = 0 -3661.13 3039.21 10741.69 6573.43 7016.68 11768.80 28926.98
k = 3 -5160.30 2706.18 11063.19 6942.36 7657.57 12192.57 28926.98
k = 10 -4767.64 2101.49 11245.85 7803.19 9152.97 13181.36 28926.98
k = 20 -3983.72 1605.80 10672.11 9032.94 11289.26 14593.92 28926.98
λ = 3
k = 0 -14104.02 945.54 19154.46 4220.01 2415.15 9731.33 35683.30
k = 3 -14158.12 1736.78 21797.33 4595.20 3163.75 10388.47 35683.30
k = 10 -14284.37 3042.36 30479.43 5470.66 4910.49 11921.81 35683.30
k = 20 -14464.71 10135.65 31160.75 6721.31 7405.84 14112.28 35683.30
Table 13: Prospective value evolution for evaluation frequencies higher than one year
and different parameter values
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5.4 The actual attitude towards financial losses as a function of
the portfolio evaluation frequency
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Figure 14: The loss aversion index on the two relevant evaluation frequency segments for
λ = 2.25 and k ∈ {0; 3; 10; 20}
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Figure 15: The loss aversion index on the two relevant evaluation frequency segments for
λ ∈ {0.5; 1; 2.25; 3} and k = 3
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Figure 16: The average absolute cushion 1− z for different evaluation frequencies,
λ = 2.25, and k = 3
Cushions
Sensitivity to past losses
ks (small) kl (large)
z < 1 (gains)
likely not likely
(λ˜st < λ) (λ˜
l
t < λ˜
s
t < λ)
z > 1 (losses)
likely likely
(λ˜st > λ) (λ˜
l
t > λ˜
s
t > λ)
Table 14: Possible scenarios for LAi, where λ˜st (λ˜
l
t) stand for LAi under small (large)
values of k
Fitted model
Coefficient 95%-confidence
Goodness of fit
estimates interval
τ ≤ 1 year *A first-order power specification performs identically well.
a3 = 0.0004866 (−0.000337, 0.00131)
a3τ
3 + a2τ
2 a2 = −0.01146 (−0.0277, 0.004782) R
2: 0.6055
+a1τ + a0 a1 = 0.08541 (−0.007317, 0.1781) Adjusted R
2: 0.4576
a0 = 1.994 (1.849, 2.139) RMSE: 0.03844
τ ≥ 1 year
b3 = −0.006142 (−0.01023,−0.00205)
b3τ
3 + b2τ
2 b2 = 0.07538 (0.01961, 0.1312) R
2: 0.9177
+b1τ + b0 b1 = −0.2239 (−0.4462,−0.0015) Adjusted R
2: 0.856
b0 = 2.361 (2.115, 2.607) RMSE: 0.03592
Table 15: Estimated evolution of the loss aversion index as a function of the portfolio
evaluation frequency for λ = 2.25, k = 3
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Figure 17: The global first-order risk aversion on the two relevant evaluation frequency
segments for λ = 2.25 and k ∈ {0; 3; 10; 20}
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Figure 18: The global first-order risk aversion on the two relevant evaluation frequency
segments for λ ∈ {0.5; 1; 2.25; 3} and k = 3
Fitted model
Coefficient 95%-confidence
Goodness of fit
estimates interval
τ ≤ 1 year
a3 = 112.7 (4.283, 221.2)
a3τ
3 + a2τ
2 a2 = −1, 999 (−4, 138, 140) R
2: 0.7668
+a1τ + a0 a1 = 11, 120 (−1, 092, 23, 330) Adjusted R
2: 0.6793
a0 = −10, 940 (−30, 030, 8, 161) RMSE: 5062
τ ≥ 1 year
b1 = 9, 644 (4, 917, 14, 370) R
2: 0.8059
b1τ + b0 b0 = 17, 310 (−6, 558, 41, 190) Adjusted R
2: 0.7736
RMSE: 12,520
Table 16: Estimated evolution of the global first-order risk aversion as a function of the
portfolio evaluation frequency for λ = 2.25, k = 3
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